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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

STEVEN E. STRAHM,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960414-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant, Steven E. Strahm, appeals his conviction for
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (R. 136). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Where nothing suggested to the trial court that trial

counsel had a conflict of interest, did the trial court
erroneously fail to inquire into whether a conflict existed?
2.

Where defendant claims counsel's performance affected

his decision not to accept a plea offer, but the case law
precludes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that
basis and no record supports the factual assertion, has defendant
1

established that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel?
Defendant's claims present questions of law reviewed on the
trial record because defendant raises them for the first time on
direct appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing.

State v.

Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103
(1995) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §765-103 (1995) (R. 6). A jury convicted defendant of the charged
crime (R. 13 6, 139). The trial court sentenced defendant to the
statutory prison term of zero-to-five years, and imposed a $2,000
fine plus an eighty-five percent surcharge (R. 141). The trial
court also imposed a firearm enhancement not to exceed five years
to run consecutively with defendant's sentence (R. 142).
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 146).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The historical facts have little relevance to this case.
Briefly, defendant threatened another driver with a gun during a
2

traffic dispute (R. 174-77, 204-208).
In late October 1995, it became apparent that defendant's
attorney, Mr. Mark Moffat, would have to testify on defendant's
behalf (R. 63, 242-51, 259-60)-1

By order dated November 3,

1995, the trial court struck the trial date, allowed Mr. Moffat
to withdraw, and appointed Mr. Patrick Anderson to represent
defendant (R. 69). The trial court rescheduled trial for
December 11, 1995 (R. 72). 2
On December 11, 1995, the first day of trial, defendant
moved to have another attorney appointed, and Mr. Anderson moved
to withdraw from representing defendant (R. 77). However, when
defendant discovered that replacing Mr. Anderson would delay his
trial until February, he opted to go to trial on the following
day with Mr. Anderson (R. 162-64).
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts.

x

Mr. Moffat's testimony became necessary for reasons
unrelated to the appellate issues. Briefly, Mr. Moffat testified
in order to discredit the testimony of a State's witness who had
originally given Mr. Moffat a version of the events that
exonerated defendant (id.).
defendant misrepresents that the substitution of counsel
took place on the "eve of trial." Appellant's Brief at 2.
3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Ineffective assistance (conflict of interest).

Defendant concedes that the record demonstrates no actual
conflict of interest, but argues that a statement made by trial
counsel triggered the trial court's duty to inquire into whether
a conflict existed.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant

counsel who will not subordinate defendant's interests to his own
or another client's. Nothing in this record suggested that that
might happen; therefore, nothing triggered the trial court's duty
to inquire into a potential conflict that would violate
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel.

The

statement on which defendant relies establishes, at most, that
defendant and trial counsel had difficulty getting along.
Because the Sixth Amendment does not protect defendant against
personality conflicts with his appointed counsel, that statement
did not require the trial court to explore the possibility of a
conflict of interest.
2.

Ineffective assistance.

Defendant contends that his

trial counsel represented him ineffectively because they did not
caution him that the State could seek a firearm enhancement to
his sentence.

Defendant contends that, had he known about the

enhancement, he could have given the State's plea offer more
4

serious consideration.

This argument fails for two reasons.

First, defendant cannot predicate an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on his failure to accept a plea bargain.

Second,

the record contains no support for his factual assertion.
Without record support, his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim fails.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE NOTHING SUGGESTED TO THE TRIAL COURT THAT TRIAL#
COUNSEL HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY MADE NO INQUIRY INTO WHETHER ONE EXISTED
Defendant contends that statements made by his trial
:~unsel, Mr. Anderson, triggered the trial court's duty to
inquire whether Mr. Anderson had a conflict of interest.
Appellant's Brief at 5.

Defendant concedes, however, that the

record demonstrates no clear conflict of interest.

Id.

Moreover, nothing in the record suggested that a conflict
existed; therefore, nothing triggered the trial court's duty to
inquire whether Mr. Anderson had a conflict of interest.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant representation by
conflict-free counsel.
1990).

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App.

That right guarantees defendant counsel who will pursue

his interests over those of anyone else.
5

See, e.g.. Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-51 (1980) (giving an example of
counsel representing multiple clients and promoting one client's
interests to the detriment of the other's interests).

This Court

has recognized that a conflict violating a defendant's right to
conflict-free counsel may arise where counsel represents multiple
defendants with conflicting interests, or where counsel's
personal interests conflict with defendant's.

See State v.

Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488-90 (Utah App. 1991).

In Johnson, for

example, this Court found that counsel's interest in exonerating
himself from the same crime with which the State had charged his
client conflicted with defending his client.

Id. at 490.

When a trial court becomes aware of a potential conflict, it
must take adequate steps to resolve the issue; if it does not,
the appellate courts presume prejudice and reverse.
v. Velarde. 806 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah App. 1991).

Id.: State

However,

"x[a]bsent special circumstances'" trial courts may assume that
no conflict exists.

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d at 72 (quoting

Cnyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980)).
In order to have triggered the trial court's duty to inquire
into a potential conflict, something must have suggested to the
trial court that Mr. Anderson might subordinate defendant's
interests to his own interests or the interests of another
6

client.

When defendant asked for a new attorney, he based his

request on his claims that Mr. Anderson: 1) did not contact the
jail to assure that defendant could have a haircut and scissors
to trim his mustache; 2) did not get clothes for court in time
for defendant to try them on, and the clothes he brought did not
fit; 3) did not schedule a meeting where Mr. Anderson, Mr.
Moffat, and he could discuss the case together; and 4) did not
know until three days before trial that defendant had a day
planner identifying the discrepancies in the preliminary hearing
(R. 159-61).3

In support of his motion to withdraw, Mr. Anderson

stated, UI believe it would be in Mr. Strahm's best interest to
allow him to fire me or to allow me to withdraw.

I feel due to

some things that Mr. Strahm like if the trial went forth today, I
would not effectively represent him, and it would be in his best
interests and interest of justice to allow him to withdraw" (R.
161-62).

The transcript of the entire hearing is attached as

addendum B.
Nothing that either defendant or Mr. Anderson told the trial
court suggested that Mr. Anderson would subordinate defendant's

3

0n appeal, defendant represents that he asked for new
counsel in part because he and Mr. Anderson could not agree on
which witnesses Mr. Anderson should contact. Appellant's Brief
at 3. Nothing in the record supports this representation.
7

interests to his own or another client's.

Defendant's complaints

merely demonstrated defendant's general dissatisfaction with
counsel's performance.4
Similarly, Mr. Anderson stated only that he could not
represent defendant effectively.

At most, that statement might

be interpreted to suggest that Mr. Anderson did not feel
adequately prepared (an interpretation that the record refutes).5
That statement does not suggest that Mr. Anderson would have
subordinated defendant's interests to his own or another
client's.
Moreover, Mr. Anderson's statement that he could not
effectively represent defendant immediately followed defendant's
complaints that Mr. Anderson had not performed services that
defendant thought Mr. Anderson should perform.

When read

together, defendant's complaints and Mr. Anderson's statement

4

Moreover, defendant has not relied on his own statements to
the trial court to support his argument that the trial court
should have inquired into a potential conflict. Appellant's
Brief at 4-5.
5

When the trial court denied Mr. Anderson's motion to
withdraw, the court stated, "You are prepared" (R. 164). Neither
Mr. Anderson nor defendant disputed the trial court's statement.
Moreover, Mr. Anderson extensively cross-examined the State's
witnesses (R. 179-99, 200-202, 213-22, 226-28, 233-36) and
presented a defense witness to discredit the testimony of one of
the State's key witnesses.
8

establish that Mr. Anderson believed he could not represent
defendant because they were not getting along.

Personality

conflicts do not equate to conflicts of interest that violate
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel.

See People v.

Burchette. 628 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 (111. App. 1993)("[w]e cannot
equate a 'personality clash' with a conflict or potential
conflict of interest").
Finally, the circumstances of this case did not suggest the
existence of a possible conflict.

Mr. Anderson did not represent

multiple clients charged with the same crime and was not also
charged with or under investigation for the same crime that the
State had charged against defendant.

Compare Cuyler v. Sullivan,

446 U.S. at 349-51 (counsel represented multiple clients); State
v. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 488-90 (counsel under investigation for
same crime with which state had charged Johnson).
Because nothing suggested to the trial court that Mr.
Anderson had a conflict of interest, nothing triggered the trial
court's duty to inquire whether such a conflict existed.
Therefore, the trial court's failure to inquire into a possible
conflict of interest does not state a basis for reversal.

9

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
FAILS BECAUSE HE ERRONEOUSLY PREDICATES THE CLAIM ON
HIS FAILURE TO CONSIDER A PLEA OFFER AND BECAUSE NO
RECORD SUPPORTS HIS FACTUAL ASSERTION
In order to establish that he did not receive the level of
representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, defendant must
establish two elements.

First, he must identify the specific

acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,

690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert,
denied, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994).

Second, he must affirmatively

prove that the challenged acts or omissions undermine confidence
in the outcome of his criminal trial.

Strickland v. Washington.

466 U.S. at 694; Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 522.
However, this Court "may consider an ineffective assistance
claim on direct appeal only if the record is adequate to permit a
decision.

A trial record is adequate only if 'we are not aware

of any evidence or arguments which might be made that is not now
before us.'" State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
Defendant bases his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
entirely on his assertion that counsel did not inform him that he

10

faced the possibility of a firearm enhancement.

Defendant

asserts that he would have given the State's plea offer more
serious consideration had he known about the possible
enhancement.

Appellant's Brief at 6-8.

Defendant's argument fails for two independent reasons.
First, defendant cannot predicate his ineffectiveness claim on
h.i3 failure to accept a plea bargain.
913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987).

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d

In Knight. the Utah Supreme Court

rejected Knight's argument that his counsel could not represent
him effectively in the plea process because a discovery violation
deprived counsel of information necessary to advise him about
accepting or rejecting a plea offer.

Id.

The Court noted that

it had ''previously rejected claims alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel when a defendant has rejected a plea
bargain and has retained his or her right to a fair trial."

Id.

Second, the record supports none of defendant's factual
assertions.

The record contains no evidence that counsel did not

inform defendant about the possible firearm enhancement, that the
State had made any plea offer, or even that defendant would have
chosen the plea offer over going to trial had he known about the

11

possible enhancement.6

Without any record support for his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that claim fails.

Id.

See also State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 292-93
(Utah)(appellate court's cannot consider claims that depend upon
missing portions of the record), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044
(1982); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App.
1992)(u[i]n the absence of an adequate record on appeal, we
cannot address the issues raised and presume the correctness of
the disposition made by the trial court")/ overruled on other
grounds. 913 P.2d 350, 357 n.3 (Utah 1996).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argue above, the State requests that
the Court affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

17 -

day of Qouu

,

/ 9 ?7<

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
^^Cri^V*^

o

i^<^T^-^\^

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General

defendant failed to seek a remand pursuant to rule 23B,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to develop this factual
record.
12
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/???:
Todd D. Gardner
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-103

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assault against peace officer.
Evidence of assault
—Sufficient
Cited.
Assault against peace officer.
This section and § 76-5*102.4 do not proscribe identical conduct when the assault is
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to
different classes of persons, the former apply*
ing to "any person" and the latter applying to
"any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982
(Utah Ct App. 1989).
Evidence of assault
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, the
videotape of all bookings, including the defen-

dant's, was erased and recycled after 72 hours if
there was no request to retain it, and the
defendant sought dismissal of the charge that
she, while in custody, had assaulted a police
officer, because there was no showing that loss
of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the issue
of the defendant's guilt, the trial court erred in
dismissing the assault charge. State v. Jiminez,
761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct App. 1988).
—Sufficient
Jury verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory
defenses of self-defense and defense of habitation, was supported by the evidence. State v.
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct App. 1989).
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah
Ct App. 1994).

76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.6, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 149, § 1; 1994, ch. 37, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, inserted "or otherwise propels."

Effective Dates, — Laws 1992, ch. 59 became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Spitting.
Spitting on a correctional officer was not a
crime under this section, as the only prohibited
means of propelling a substance or object was

by throwing. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah
Ct App. 1993) (decided before 1994 amendment
adding "or otherwise propels").

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5*103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, 5 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2.

Cross-References. — Attempt, J 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
2

THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ORIGINAL

3

FILE6 DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

4
5
6
7

JUL 1 0 1996

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN STRAHM,
Defendant.

SA^T LA*E COUNTY

Case No. 960130
951900437

8
9
10
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
11
12
13
14
15

Proceedings before the Honorable
TIMOTHY R. HANSEN
on December 11, 1995

16
17
18
19
20

FILED

21

Utah Court of Appeals

22
23

CATHY GALLEGOS
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER
2901 W. Bedford Road
West Valley City, Utah 84119

AUG 2 8 199S
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

24
25

0 0 0*5*

1
2
3
4 I
5
6

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Steven Strahm
951900347. Appearances, please.
MR. LEMCKE:

Howard Lemcke for the State.

State is here and prepared to proceed.
MR. ANDERSON:

Patrick Anderson for Mr.

7

Strahm, Your Honor. As I have indicated to the court, we

8

need to address, I guess, a joint motion.

9

asked for a new attorney.

10
11
12
13

Defendant has

I would make a motion to

withdraw as counsel for Mr. Strahm.
THE COURT: Mr. Strahm, why do you want
another lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, I have asked my

14

attorney a couple simple things before this trial today.

15

I asked him if he could call the jail, make sure I would

16

be able to get a haircut, use a pair of scissors to trim

17

my mustache, look presentable in front of the court.

18

also asked him if he could bring some clothes since I have

19

not been granted bail that I could reach to get on the

20

outside to take care of these things on my own, and I

21

never did receive the chance to try these clothes on until

22

this morning.

23

brought me did not fit, the clothes they brought again

24

didn't fit, and then I was asked to wear the clothes that

25

I was arrested in in this courtroom, which were wrinkled.

I

When they are brought up, the clothes they

1

The shirt was wrinkled.

I feel like if I am going to a

2

jury trial, I should at least look presentable.

3

feel like either Mr. Anderson is too busy or something

4

else is going on.

5

but I felt like someone should have brought the clothes to

6

where I could have tried them on before the trial.

7

felt like I should have been able to have a haircut and

8

use a pair of scissors instead of having to use a razor in

9

a jail cell to get ready for a trial. Also, there's been

And I

I don't want to put the blame anywhere,

I also

10

a few other things I have asked him to do on the outside

11

to contact the bank, to make arrangements to where I could

12

get money on my books and that's never been done. Mr.

13

Anderson was good enough to take twenty dollars out of his

14

pocket and put it on my books, which I appreciate.

15

him I would pay him back, but I also feel the attorney

16

that I have that I want to represent me on this I want it

17

to be the same attorney that represents me on these other

18

charges.

19
20
21

I told

THE COURT: Who represents you on the witness
tampering?
MR. ANDERSON:

On the witness tampering

22

charges because of the trial, the capital homicide I had,

23

I was unable to try that case.

24

be a different attorney.

25

that case I was unable to represent him.

So it was going to have to

I did the preliminary hearing in

1

THE COURT: No one has been assigned?

2

MR. ANDERSON:

Candace Johnson, someone in my

3

office.

Mr. Strahm indicates he wants another attorney.

4

It will go to a different team on the conflict contract,

5

Your Honor.

6

THE DEFENDANT:

There was one other reason, I

7

was told Mr. Anderson and Mr. Moffat would have visited me

8

at the jail to discuss this case. Now that Mr. Moffat is

9

a witness for myself, Mr. Anderson was the only one that

10

showed up.

11

the witness who or my attorney who is now a witness and

12

now my present attorney and I can't all sit down and

13

discuss the case.

14

had a day planner that had all my notes in it of all the

15

discrepancies from the preliminary hearing until two or

16

three days ago.

17

that.

18

I don't see how I can get effective counsel if

Mr. Anderson didn't even know that I

I just feel like I am not satisfied with

THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, anything else you

19

would state for the record that allow me to delay this

20

trial to change counsel?

21

MR. ANDERSON:

I believe it would be in Mr.

22

Strahm's best interest to allow him to fire me or to allow

23

me to withdraw.

24

like if the trial went forth today, I would not

25

effectively represent him, and it would be in his best

I feel due to some things that Mr. Strahm

1

interests and interest of justice to allow him to

2

withdraw.

3

THE COURT: Are you telling me as an officer

4

of the court, the unspecified relationship I don't expect

5

it to be discussed*

6

effective counsel?

You don't believe you could be

7

MR. ANDERSON:

That is correct.

8

THE COURT: Anything from the State?

9

MR. LEMCKE:

Except, Your Honor, that you

10 I know we have been here. We have had our witnesses now on
11

a couple different occasions.

It's difficult for them, we

12

would expect that this would be, if nothing else, a waiver

13

of speedy trial rights through actions of the defendant,

14

he would not be allowed to complain about that.

15

ask that although we note since he doesn't have a new

16

attorney today, we could not schedule a trial today.

We would

17 j Would I be allowed some latitude in contacting my
18
19 I

witnesses, if we need time when that is reset?
THE COURT: Mr. Strahm, you understand if

20

your attorney withdraws today pursuant to this request,

21

this trial will not go forward today?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, Your Honor, I do. I

23

would hope it wouldn't take too much longer than a

24

reasonable amount of time to reschedule it.

25

shouldn't be punished any more than I already have by a

I feel like I

1

hundred thousand dollars bail that we could be able to

2

reschedule this and get to go on in a reasonable amount of

3

time.

4
5

THE COURT:
12.

6
7

Earliest I can do it is February

THE DEFENDANT:

I believe the other trial was

scheduled for—

8 I

MR. ANDERSON:

9

THE DEFENDANT:

10

THE COURT:

16th of January.
16th of January.

I don't care what the other trial

11

was set for.

12

have, I don't have the matters that have precedent over

13

that February 12, if you will waive your rights to a

14

speedy trial?

15
16
17

I am telling you the first available date I

THE DEFENDANT:

Does that mean I have to stay

in jail until February 12?
THE COURT:

In all likelihood, otherwise, you

18

wouldn't have a speedy trial— you don't get it both ways.

19

Mr. Strahm, this case has been continued numerous times

20

usually for reasons that it's not the responsibility of

21

the State if you want me to continue it again, so I can

22

consider getting you another attorney, that's the best I

23

can do for you. And if that's not acceptable, then let's

24

try the case.

25

THE DEFENDANT:

What date would that be?

1

THE COURT:

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

Let's go on with it then,

Your Honor.

8
9

Or I can get you some other

clothes.

6
7

What if I decided to keep Mr.

Anderson as my attorney?

4
5

February 12.

THE COURT: Okay let's do it.

All right.

I

think what I will do is this I think I will have the jury

10

come back in the morning.

11

waiting any longer.

12

I don't want to keep them

Nine-thirty in the morning work?

MR. LEMCKE: A couple things.

First of all,

13

defendant stated the clothes he had before were wrinkled.

14

Would the court ask him if in fact they were pressed or

15

laundered if they would be acceptable clothes?

16

THE COURT:

If they aren't, they wouldn't be

17 J acceptable, let's put it that way.

Mr. Anderson, I guess

18

you can't withdraw.

19

trial rights.

20

prepared.

21

start tomorrow at nine-thirty and, Mr. Lemcke, I need your

22

assistance with regard to the jail to see that his

23

clothing is laundered so that—

24
25

Your client won't waive his speedy

I wouldn't require him to do that.

You are

I guess you will have to do the best you can,

MR. LEMCKE:

I will do what I can, if counsel

can help me locate where they are at the moment.

8
THE COURT:

I want somebody to tell the jail

to do that.
MR. LEMCKE: We will do it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, this case will go
tomorrow at nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
regardless.

I will see you then.
********

This will go
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